This is a political document loaded with embarras de richesses. It has 12 essays by leading authorities on US foreign policy each propounding a complete theory in itself, yet they all mesh in smoothly.

Charles S. Maier defines an empire, but emphasizes that no imperium can depend on consensual principle or economic means alone. To this, Marilyn Young adds a quotation from Thomas Friedmann: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist”.

Lloyd Gardner explains the occupation of Iraq as part of the stake that the US acquired in the Middle East during the Second World War. It so happens  that the road America wants to take in the region now — establishing friendly governments to carry out the America’s global mission — passes through Baghdad (‘bag dad’, to Americans).

Young says the Americans have always been self-righteous ogres; hence, their readiness to use violence to resolve all issues. The problem is that they need allied armies to serve them globally, may be nationally oriented. In short, they need Brits, Aussies and Gurkhas.

John Prados sees the US today reducing all problems to terrorism. Even then, the invasion of Iraq remains an unanswered question. It is also a refutation of Rumsfeld’s theory of quick strike instead of invasion. It would be a different matter if Iraq does turn into another Vietnam.

Mc Cormick holds that the militarization of the US’s foreign relations is a result of economic slackness, because hegemony is “the ability to translate (military) power into influence over friends and allies”, which it is increasingly unable to do. As a result, the Iraqi adventure becomes a manifestation of America’s contradiction with the European Union. The US consequently accepts the contraction of globalization and sees military superiority as the only basis for global leadership.
Mary Nolan feels that, although the US has been decentered as an economic model, Europe still shares its objectives. But the US refuses to share power with it. Greg Grandin, on the other hand, says USA learnt methods of imperialism in Central America, where, when it did not like the policies of some government, it invaded the country through ‘engineered freedom-fighters’ and put in place a new regime. It repeated the act in Iraq, but “ Iraq is not Nicaragua”.

Michael Adas deals with America’s use of force in the Philippines after it was wrested from Spain and used all methods of colonialism to consolidate its rule. The problem, however, lay in the fact that most of the country’s population were peasants, of which the US had no experience.

Thus, instead of making land reforms, the US colonial regime allied itself with the landlords and the local Mafiosi and so, the rule did not bring prosperity to the country.

John Dower does not find any similarity between the military occupation of Iraq and those of Germany and Japan after the war. While the latter was done for valid reasons, he does not think there is any logic to the Iraqi invasion. He also finds it ironic that the US claims to oppose weapons of mass destruction, while producing new arsenals and adopting a policy of pre-emptive attack, while denouncing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

Carol Gluck finds that the US has forgotten Korea and learnt all the wrong lessons from Vietnam, in a bid to avoid involvement — “and what is pre-emptive attack for the sake of self-defence but an act of aggressive war”. Finally, he resigns his analysis to the fact that “habits of hegemony are slow to change”.

Edward Rhodes dwells on the tension between the liberal order the US wishes to impose on the world and its free use of force, although the use of force defeats liberalism. However, he recognizes that a liberal republic can be imperialist. Anders Stephanson blames Lenin for stifling the Marxist thought on imperialism with his theory. He traces the US expansion from the occupation of the “empty” lands on the North American continent to its present-day drive, where the government believes that its position remains unparalleled. However, it is capitalist, not feudal and “the inexorably expanding capital requires only the predictability of law and order, not the kind of violent disorder and illegalities brought by the will to empire” (p. 275).

They all agree, in one way or another, that the US has an empire, though not in the traditional sense. It usually provides the conquered land with full citizenship rights for its inhabitants.

Actually, America’s entire development has been different from that of others. Since, the country had no feudal background, it started with the simple-commodity economy, which developed into capitalism. Even slavery in the Southern states combined property in the form of humans with a market economy — a “pure” capitalism of sorts, if you will.

This capitalized “Imperialism” began when it intruded into Central America, whose lands it did not annex. That gave rise to a systematic unequal exchange, whereby the Latins surrendered more labour hours for less dollars.

Even so, the US is really an imperium, not an empire, which means that it commands, or attempts to command, the shape of the world order. It also asserts primary claim on natural resources of the world and wants every market to be opened to its capital in the name of globalization. The whole structure is underpinned by five military commands covering the globe.

Of course, there are contradictions in the imperium. The European Union has tended to break away from American hegemony after the Soviet menace disappeared. It firmly opposed the US invasion of Iraq. The tried method of bringing the central Americans to heel by changing their governments does not seem to work with the Iraqis. The attempt to preserve monopoly over nuclear weapons, while being free to threaten non-nuclear countries with its arsenal, appears absurd especially after USA’s unilateral, though de facto, recognition of India as a nuclear power, its silent tolerance of the nuclear weapons development in Pakistan and its completely turning a blind eye to the Israeli acquisition of nuclear capabilities even by stealing her primary batch of fission materials right from her own stockpiles (ref: Jumblat Affair).

The fact is that the US economy is not strong enough to exercise global hegemony. Therefore, the sword is drawn more often, which, in turn, weakens the central economy further. This ‘new empire’ seems to learn very little from the events which are its own creation; cares very little for the international institutions which it has planted itelf; and fails to recognize that political consciousness that has grown worldwide. Not only is imperialism outdated, even the methods of the imperium are unacceptable.

Once a retired US General, in the course of a candid chat about India and her leadership said that ‘you don’t learn from your history. I afraid today his own country, a Super Power, stands accused of the same error of judgment. While the whole world admires American technology, and drools over her dollars still the US must find new methods to preserve her hegemony. The imperium may not like it but its empire of arrogance stands challenged from all corners of the globe—challenged politically, economically and even militarily. And this challenge will not be thwarted by her ‘War on terror’ alone.

                                                      –Abraar Hussain